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Abstract: This essay aims to provide a dual reading of Flann O’Brien’s novel The
Third Policeman: a literary one, centred on the multifarious references to famous
works by authors such as Sterne, Gide, Dostoevsky and Kafka, and a linguistic
one, in which the intertextual game is sought in the language of legal texts,
particularly those belonging to the Irish tradition. While Patrizia Nerozzi
explores the interplay with literary genres, motifs and narrative patterns, Mara
Logaldo’s analysis identifies wordplays and other recurring rhetorical strategies,
focusing on the typical traits of Irish and Legal English. Both studies concentrate
on the parody of law that permeates the text: while the literary reading high-
lights the complex declinations of nonsense within this novel vis-à-vis other
literary texts, the linguistic analysis shows to what extent Flann O’Brien exploits
the idiosyncrasies of legal language to build up, with words, his architecture of
absurdity, his fable of law.
Keywords: intertextuality, parody, obscure language, legal language, Irish law
texts, Irish syntax
1 Locating the law: uncanny settings and literary
architectures of absurdity
“That is a nice piece of law and order for you, a terrific indictment of democratic self-
government, a beautiful commentary on Home Rule.”1,2
*Corresponding author: Mara Logaldo, IULM University, Milano, Italy,
E-mail: mara.logaldo@iulm.it
1 This section is by Patrizia Nerozzi.
2 Flann O’Brien, The Third Policeman (London: Harper Perennial, 2007), 165. Further references
abbreviated as TP.
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The Third Policeman, FlannO’Brien’s3 second novel in English, waswritten between
1939 and 1940. It was rejected by Longman, his publisher, on the grounds that the
plot and the inclusion of extensive footnotes in the text made the book unreadable,
carrying the suggestion that the author “should become less fantastic.”4 O’Brien
never tried to publish it elsewhere, telling friends he had lost the manuscript in a
pub or mislaid it on a train. The manuscript was found after the author’s death on a
sideboard in his home and published posthumously in 1967 byMacGibbon and Kee.
In a letter to William Saroyan, dated 14 February 1940, he had written:
It is supposed to be a funny book but I don’t know about that […]. When you get to the end
of this book you realize that my hero or main character (he’s a heel and a killer) has been
dead throughout the book and that all the queer ghastly things which have been happen-
ing to him are happening in a sort of hell which he earned for the killing […]. It is made
clear that this sort of thing goes on for ever […]. When you are writing about the world of
the dead – and the damned – where none of the rules and laws (not even the law of
gravity) holds good, there is any amount of scope for back-chat and funny cracks.5
The Third Policeman has been defined “the first great masterpiece […] of what we
generally refer to now as post-modernism” and often considered a dark, comic novel,
advertised as “the funniest and scariest book ever written.”6 It displays a unique
mixture of literary models, from criminal autobiography to gothic romance, from
regional novel to fairy tale, from horror story to detective novel and science fiction,
3 The name Flann O’Brien was in fact a pen name for Brian O’Nolan (1911–1966), civil servant,
novelist, playwright and journalist, today considered a major figure in twentieth-century Irish litera-
ture. In his lifetime he was known under yet another pseudonym, Myles na Gopaleen, with which he
signed “Cruikskeen Lawn,” his column for the Irish Times. His copious pen names include, among
others, BrotherBarnabusandGeorgeKnowall.At Swim-Two-Birds, O’Brien’s first novel,waspublished
in 1939, selling just 244 copies before the London warehouse in which it was stored was destroyed in
the Blitz. However, as it was said, the book survived the war while Hitler did not. It is his best-known
work. Perceiving its originality, Graham Green, who was then a reader for Collins Publisher, wrote in
his report of the book: “It is in the line of Tristram Shandy and Ulysses: its amazing spirits do not
disguise the seriousness of the attempt to present, simultaneously as it were, all the literary traditions
of Ireland […]. We have had books inside books before now, and characters who are given life outside
their fiction, but O’Nolan takes Pirandello and Gide a long way further.” Quoted in Robert Antony
Welch, The Cold of May Day Monday: An Approach to Irish Literary History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014), 190.
4 “We realize the author’s ability but think that he should become less fantastic and in this new
novel he is more so.” Quoted in the “About the Book” section, TP, 5.
5 Flann O’Brien, Letter to William Saroyan, dated 14 February, 1940. Quoted in “Publisher’s
Note,” TP, 207.
6 Keith Hopper, Flann O’ Brien: A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Post-Modernist (Cork: Cork
University Press, 1995). In February 2009, the Blue Raincoat Theatre staged Jocelyn Clarke’s
adaptation of The Third Policeman in Dublin.
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exhibiting an intricate network of genres and literary references: Kafka, not only in
The Trial but also in America, Sterne, Gide, Huysmans, Swift, Dostoevsky, Melville’s
Bartleby, Beckett, T. S. Eliot, Lewis Carroll. Joycean allusions mingle with old Celtic
motifs;7 popular culture is interspersed with learned references.
On the set of the Irish countryside scattered with deserted houses, a regional
farce is transformed into the universal allegory of man’s destiny where the prota-
gonist/narrator’s picaresque quest for the location of justice stretches to absurdity
the relationship between human law and God’s law. “Not everybody knows how I
killed old Philip Mathers, smashing his jaw in with my spade; but first it is better to
speak of my friendship with John Divney because it was he who first knocked old
Mathers down by giving him a great blow in the neck with a special bicycle pump
which he manufactured himself out of a hollow iron bar” (TP, 7). The Third
Policeman opens with a tale of robbery, leading the reader to expect the murderer’s
confession of his attempts to get his hands on the money for which he killed an old
neighbor. But the reader’s expectations are totally disregarded. Starting out as a
criminal autobiography, the story soon turns into a fable of absurdity, told by a
nameless narrator, the eccentric son of a pub keeper in an Irish rural village:
I was born a long time ago. My father was a strong farmer andmymother owned a public house.
Weall lived in thepublic housebut itwasnot a stronghouse at all andwas closedmost of theday
becausemy father was out at work on the farm andmymother was always in the kitchen and for
some reason the customers never came until it was nearly bed-time […]. My father I do not
remember well but he was a strong man and did not talk much except on Saturdays when he
would mention Parnell with the customers and say that Ireland was a queer country. (TP, 7)
After his parents’ death, our hero leaves home for “a strange school” (TP, 9) where he
comes to know “something of de Selby”. That proves to be the turning point of his life:
“[…] itwas for de Selby I committedmy first serious sin. Itwas for him that I committed
my greatest sin” (TP, 9). Uninterested as he is in his family property, he undertakes his
“Grand Tour:”
I spent some months in other places broadening my mind and finding out what a complete
edition of de Selby’s works would cost me […]. In one of the places where I was broadening
my mind I met one night with a bad accident. I broke my left leg (or, if you like, it was
broken for me) in six places and when I was well enough again to go my way I had one leg
made of wood, the left one. (TP, 9–10)
However, nothing can shatter his firm belief: “[…] if my name was to be
remembered, it would be remembered with de Selby’s” (TP, 10).
7 ConcettaMazullo, “FlannO’Brien’sHellishOtherworld: FromBuile Suibhne toTheThirdPoliceman,”
Irish University Review, Journal of Irish Studies, ed. Christopher Murray, 25.2 (1995): 318–27.
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Even if he has no name whatsoever, the narrator remains a devoted
student of Professor de Selby, a French savant and mechanist philosopher,
champion of scholarly erudition ever on hand to implement his lucubration.
His is the discovery that the earth is not round but shaped more or less like a
sausage; his is the explanation that the phenomenon of night is a form of
industrial pollution, an accumulation of black air, so darkness is “simply an
accretion of ‘black air’” (TP, 120). Like Des Esseintes, the protagonist of
Huymans’ À Rébours, Selby explains how you can travel to another city with-
out leaving your room and investigates the nature of time and eternity through
a system of mirrors. It is to sponsor the publication of his commentaries on de
Selby’s works, a definitive “De Selby Index,” that he has murdered his
neighbor.
The plot of the novel is prey to continuous interruptions and semantic
twists through a play with footnotes and digressions which appear to the
reader as unmistakably Sternean.8 The story breaks into manifold layers as
in a cubist painting, or an expressionist film, intentionally tormenting the
reader who is dragged from the enchanting descriptions of the Irish landscape
to the sudden, frightening appearances of quaint buildings, “roofless ‘houses’
and ‘houses’ without walls” (TP, 22), bursting open like theatrical sets inhab-
ited by terrifying, grotesque characters. The tragic irony generated by the
narrator’s innocence, incapable as he is of understanding the false nature of
his partner in crime, explodes into the performance of hilarious comic gags in
which he wears the fool’s cap. From the satirical to the nonsensical, restlessly
moving backwards and forwards in a land of horrific wonders where the
deformed perspectives of buildings hold the monstrous dimensions of the
characters, the reader is held by a nightmarish, claustrophobic atmosphere.
While the satirical representation of Irish institutions strikes contemporary
notes, the story outlines a parable of crime and punishment. “[…] robbery
and murder are against the law” (TP, 48) proclaims the murderer, literally
echoing Kafka: “K. lived in a state governed by law, there was universal
peace.”9
The leitmotif of the novel emerges gradually, but becomes increasingly
clear by the converging of the fragmentary elements of the plot and their
8 Unexpectedly, at least to my knowledge and from my point of view, the influence of Sterne
on O’Brien first acknowledged by Graham Greene has since been mentioned very rarely and
always in a cursory way. A fine exception is Renzo Crivelli’s review of the novel’s Italian
translation. See Renzo Crivelli, “Una percentuale e una bicicletta,” Il Sole-24 Ore (29 marzo,
1992): n.87, 24.
9 Franz Kafka, The Trial, translated by Breon Mitchell (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 6.
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symbolic undertones into the tale of the protagonist’s initiation to the ubi-
quitous presence of the law. As in an Orwellian dystopia, the law is a sort of
invisible net cast by the obtuse guardians of an authoritarian bureaucracy,
which tramples over the lives of its estranged citizens. The protagonist’s
progressive fall into the inexorable proliferation of legal quibbles turns the
hilarious parody of an archetypical police force stationed in the middle of an
Irish nowhere into a surrealistic place of eternal punishment.
The numerous, bulky quotations from de Selby’s works and his numerous
exegetes in the footnotes support the narrator’s efforts in his parodic attempts to
reconstruct meaning through his subjective experience. The ongoing digressions on
philosophy and science, his playing with knowledge as an intellectual solipsistic
recreation, paving the way to absurdity, threaten to swallow the whole tale of crime
and punishment. As in de Selby’s definition, life is not a sequence of progressive
experiences but rather a concoction of hallucinated states, devoid of any logical
principle:
Of all the many striking statements made by de Selby, I do not think that any of them
can rival his assertion that ‘a journey is an hallucination’ […]. The phrase may be found
in the Country Album… His theory, insofar as I can understand it, seems to discount the
testimony of human experience and is at variance with everything I have learnt myself
on many a country walk. Human existence de Selby has defined as ‘a succession of
static experiences each infinitely brief’, a conception which he is thought to have
arrived at from examining some old cinematograph films which belonged probably to
his nephew (TP, 52).
The far-fetched, ironic allusions to Diderot and Bergson introduce a simile
between the intricate battle of wits in Le Neveu de Rameau and the disquisi-
tions on cinema in L’évolution créatrice, where motion is described as a mere
illusion achieved by mechanical means. A Zeno’s paradox. Seemingly marked
by continuous, though perfunctory, movement, the rhythm of The
Third Policeman is a whirl whose entropic force is located in the police
station.
As I came round the bend of the road an extraordinary spectacle was presented to me.
About a hundred yards away on the left-hand side was a house which astonished me. It
looked as if it were painted like an advertisement on a board on the roadside and indeed
very poorly painted. It looked completely false and unconvincing. It did not seem to have
any depth or breadth… What bewildered me was the sure knowledge deeply-rooted in my
mind, that this was the house I was searching for and that there were people inside it. I
had no doubt at all it was the barracks of the policemen. I had never seen with my eyes
ever in my life before anything so unnatural and appalling […]. (TP, 55)
Intertextuality and Parody of Law 435
 - 10.1515/pol-2016-0023
Downloaded from De Gruyter Online at 09/28/2016 02:32:05PM by mara.logaldo@iulm.it
via Mara Logaldo
In a nightmare of instability, prey to perpetual motion, the picaresque protago-
nist, murderer, narrator, furiously riding a bicycle through the Irish countryside,
is compulsively driven to the local police station to report that his American
watch has been stolen:
As I approached, the house seemed to change its appearance. At first, it did nothing to
reconcile itself with the shape of an ordinary house but it became uncertain in outline
like a thing glimpsed under ruffled water […]. As there was no side that I could see I
thought the house must be triangular with its apex pointing towards me but when I
was only fifteen yards away I saw a small window apparently facing me and I knew
from that that there must be some side to it. Then I found myself almost in the shadow
of the structure, dry-throated and timorous from wonders and anxiety… A constabulary
crest above the door told me it was a police station. I had never seen a police station
like it (TP, 55–56).
It is from this station that the policemen of monstrous proportions monitor
the movements of local citizens, following their own irrefutable theory
about people gradually being turned into their bicycles. If they spend too much
time riding them, they undergo a dangerous metamorphosis – becoming
half-bicycle – while their bicycles become half human. This is a very disturbing
prospect, especially so for the police, to the point that one of the bicycles has such
powers of attraction that it/she becomes a victim of rape. A difficult legal case
even for Joe, the protagonist’s conscience: “[…] I have never heard of anything so
shameless and abandoned. Of course the teacher was blameless, she did not take
pleasure and did not know” (TP, 92).
How can policemen check hybrids, or potential hybrids, in a land almost
totally inhabited by hybrids? The bicycle is a personal obsession as well as an
uncanny double, a not so distant relative of Sterne’s hobby horse, which merrily
takes the characters to the border of reality to enjoy the whims of their indivi-
duality. In O’Brien’s novel, identity becomes a matter of fluxes and metamor-
phoses: it is men’s personalities that get mixed up with the personalities of their
bicycles, proclaiming the sameness of humans and objects, natural and mechan-
ical beings: “It is a difficult pancake,” McCruiskeen said, “a very compound
crux” (TP, 111).
The police station closes around a disorienting labyrinth where human
rights can get lost. The description of the interiors as well as of the police-
men’s everyday life are blurred in a vortex of nonsensical cross questioning
sessions:
436 Patrizia Nerozzi and Mara Logaldo
 - 10.1515/pol-2016-0023
Downloaded from De Gruyter Online at 09/28/2016 02:32:05PM by mara.logaldo@iulm.it
via Mara Logaldo
“What would you say a bulbul is?”
[…]
“Not one of those ladies who takes money?” I said
“No”
“Not the brass knobs on a German steam organ?”
“Not the knobs”
“Nothing to do with the independence of America or such like?”
“No”
“A mechanical engine for winding clocks?”
“No”
“A tumour, or the lather in a cow’s mouth, or those elastic articles that ladies wear?”
[…]
“A bulbul is a Persian nightingale” (TP, 67–68).
I have refusedmore requests and negativatedmore statements than anyman living or dead. I
have rejected, reneged, disagreed, refused and denied to an extent that is unbelievable (TP, 31).
One of the policemen carves ever smaller and smaller chests that are filled with
nothing but other smaller chests, which are in turn filled with other chests, the
smallest one being so small that it cannot be seen. The chests fit one into the
other perfectly. Is this pastime a never-ending Swiftian game, a tribute to the
relativity of the external world? Or are the chests a replica of the means of
detention employed for interpreting as well as applying the law the policemen
are in charge of? “They looked to me as if they were all the same size but
invested with some crazy perspective” (TP, 75). The law gives its own interpreta-
tion of reality, adjusting reality to its own “inexorable logic” and codes:
“I came here to inform you officially about the theft of my American gold watch.”
[…]
“Why should anybody steal a watch when they can steal a bicycle?”
[…]
“Who ever heard of a man riding a watch down the road or bringing a sack of turf up to
his house on the crossbar of a watch?”
“I did not say the thief wanted my watch to ride it,” I expostulated.” “Very likely he had a
bicycle of his own and that is how he got away quietly in the middle of the night” (TP, 63).
“I know what you mean,” he said. “But the law is an extremely intricate phenomenon. If
you have no name you cannot own a watch and the watch that has been stolen does not
exist and when it is found it will have to be restored to its rightful owner. If you have no
name you possess nothing and you do not exist and even your trousers are not on you
although they look as if they were from where I am sitting. On the other separate hand you
can do what you like and the law cannot touch you” (TP, 64).
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If you have no name you cannot sue anyone or claim your due but you can all
the same be condemned to death:
“Do you recall that you told me that I was not here at all because I had no name and that
my personality was invisible to the law? […] Then how can I be hanged for a murder, even
if I did commit it and there is no trial or preliminary proceedings, no caution administered
and no hearing before a Commissioner of the Public Peace?” (TP, 103).
Unfortunately, the counsel for the defence of our hero’s case is his own soul
whom he calls Joe. Like de Selby, Joe becomes his guiding spirit although
devoid of any influence on his mortal destiny. In the strange otherness he has
passed into, bureaucratic efficiency prevails unopposed, showing its darkest
side. The bizarre policemen, “up and about their incomprehensible tasks” (TP,
156), prove to be judges and hangmen at the same time, no matter how informal
their approach to the prisoner is. The perplexing dialogues that intersperse the
text may well include contemporary topics of conversation such as Irish immi-
gration to the United States:
“That is a great conundrum of a country,” said the Sergeant, “a very wide territory, a place
occupied by black men and strangers. I am told they are very fond of shooting-matches in
that quarter”
“It is a queer land” I said (TP, 59).
While the relationship between human law and God’s law is stretched to
grotesque in the tragic-cum-hilarious representation, the narrator watches a
scaffold being built in the police barracks courtyard for his own “stretching,”
as the policemen call it, while an army of one-legged men are ineffectually
dashing through the country “ON THEIR WAY TO RESCUE PRISONER” (TP,
162). Building a scaffold is no easy task: it is a matter of taking measures and
calculating weights, procuring solid wood and strong ropes which need to be
carefully inspected. The dialogue between the policeman and the
prisoner who has been condemned to death for a crime he has never
been accused of or judged for, sets up a scene on the inexpressible banality
of evil:
“I think,” he said, “we will go out and have a look at it, it is a great thing to do what is
necessary before it becomes essential and unavoidable.”
The sound he put on these words were startling and too strange. Each word seemed to
rest on a tiny cushion and was soft and far away from every other word […]. He then moved
out of the house before me to the yard, I behind him spellbound with no thought of any
kind in my head. Soon the two of us had mounted a ladder with staid unhurrying steps and
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found ourselves high beside the sailing gable of the barrack, the two of us on the lofty
scaffold, I the victim and he my hangman….
“It is a fine day in any case,” he was saying (TP, 163).
The third policeman who gives the title to the book is kept on the margin of the
story as an uncanny presence:
“[…] we never see him or hear tell of him at all because he is always on his beat and never off
it and he signs the book in the middle of the night when even a badger is asleep. He is as mad
as a hare, he never interrogates the public and he is always taking notes […]” (TP, 79).
However, in the novel’s framework of compulsion and fatality, it is the police-
men who are the depositories of the rules of this weird world as well as the
guardians of the law of an equally weird afterlife whose evanescent, fairy-tale
atmosphere dissolves the borders of sight and sound into a realm of “indescrib-
able” (TP, 140) appearances. Only in the end it does become apparent that the
narrator has been dead throughout the story:
It was a queer country we were in […]. A company of crows came out of a tree when I was
watching and flew sadly down to a field where there was a quantity of sheep attired in fine
overcoats (TP, 80).
[…] We were now going through a country full of fine enduring trees where it was always
five o’clock in the afternoon […]. There was no animal there that was bigger than a man’s
thumb and no noise superior to that which the Sergeant was making with his nose, an
unusual brand of music like wind in the chimney (TP, 83).
“‘Is it about a bicycle?’ he asked” (TP, 206). The book ends with a question put
to the narrator and his accomplice who are walking into the police station, but
the fable can go on forever and ever, like the refrain of an old ballad. Thus The
Third Policeman can be interpreted as a story about destiny and the pain of
living in a world where all communication is spent, a dark meditation on death
and the “awful”10 human condition:
Human existence being an hallucination containing in itself the secondary hallucinations
of day and night (the latter an insanitary condition of the atmosphere due to accretions of
black air) it ill becomes any men of sense to be concerned at the illusory approach of the
supreme hallucination known as death (TP, 5).
10 In an article in “Cruiskeen Lawn” dated March 1966 (a month before his death), O’Brien
wrote: “Anybody who has the courage to raise his eyes and look sanely at the awful human
condition […] must realize finally that tiny periods of temporary release from intolerable
suffering is the most that any individual has the right to expect.”
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In O’ Brien’s wasteland, the profound incompatibility with the requirement of
the law – which starts with the protagonist’s lack of a name – alludes to a
permanent alienation of the individual whenever confronted by the law, whether
human or divine. As in other works inspired by The Trial, the echo of Kafka’s
advice comes to the fore: “In the end, the only thing is to accept the way things
are. Above all, don’t call attention to yourself! Keep your mouth shut, however
much this goes against your grain! Understand that this great legal system is in a
state of delicate balance.”11 Yet, the very existence of the book contradicts this
idea. In the two epigraphs, de Selby’s words are set beside two verses from
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. They suggest that when law and order break down
it is to the strength and lucidity of our reasoning – as well as to the power of
literature to represent and move our feelings – that we must assign the role of
the defence in the trial of life: “Since the affairs of men rest still uncertain, let’s
reason with the worst that may befall” (TP, 5).
2 The “conundrum” of the law
“It is nearly an insoluble pancake,” he smiled, “a conundrum of inscrutable potentialities,
a snorter” (TP, 158).12
In an essay aptly titled Puzzle-Making Writers,13 Stefano Bartezzaghi – Italy’s
utmost expert on linguistic games – observes that there are authors who delib-
erately involve their readers in a guesswork. Not just the usual hermeneutic one,
inherent to any kind of text, but a more challenging and conscious game of
detection aimed at finding some hidden key, which can be rhetorical, logical or
both. Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman is one of such books, offered as a
cryptic tale that waits to be deciphered. “Conundrum,” “pancake,” “puzzle,”
“snorter” and their derivatives are terms that recur throughout the novel, as
eerie reminders of the author’s intentions. The text prompts clues towards either
a logical solution or a verbal one based on some kind of pun. At the same time,
though, the first-person narrator constantly frustrates both his own attempts and
those of the reader at finding it, suggesting that the conundrum is a difficult,
inscrutable and, ultimately, a “nearly” insoluble one. Expanding Patrizia
11 David Zane Mairowitz and Chantal Montellier, The Trial. A Graphic Novel (London: Self Made
Hero, 2008), 67.
12 This section and its subsections are by Mara Logaldo.
13 Stefano Bartezzaghi, Scrittori giocatori (Torino: Einaudi, 2010).
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Nerozzi’s metaphor, it could be argued that, although literature plays in the
novel the role of the counsel for the defence, the public prosecutor is an
inexorable force that not even the writer can exorcise or explain. Nameless,
and comparatively blameless, the protagonist is nonetheless condemned to
death, actualized in the text as a never-ending loop that entangles his fictional
person, the plot and eventually language itself, which is granted the right to
multiply riddles but is divested of the privilege of unravelling them.
The very nature of language, the relationship between signifiers and sig-
nifieds, is a puzzling matter. Significantly, the debate weighs language origin
and functionality against taxonomic and bureaucratic procedure. While the
narrator seems to accept the conventional view, stating that names are “arbi-
trary labels” that “confer a certain advantage in the execution of legal docu-
ments” (TP, 42), De Selby’s theory, which is quoted in the related footnote,
seems to deny the arbitrariness of the sign in favour of a direct connection
between objects and signs.
De Selby (Golden Hours, p. 93, et sequ.) has put forward an interesting theory of names.
Going back to primitive times, he regards the earliest names as crude onomatopoeic
associations with the appearance of the person or object named […]. This idea he pursued
to rather fanciful lengths, drawing up elaborate paradigms of vowels and consonants
purporting to correspond to certain indices of human race, colour and temperament and
claiming ultimately to be in a position to state the physiological ‘group’ of any person
merely from a brief study of the letters of his name after the word had been ‘rationalised’ to
allow for variations of language. (TP, 42, footnote 3)
If language is enigmatic in itself, some of its varieties are even more so. As I will
try to demonstrate, the puzzling component of The Third Policeman nourishes
itself of the cryptic language of the law. Beside characters (murderers and
murdered, robbers and policemen), settings (the archetypical police station)
and situations associated with juridical questions, legal language is pervasively
present in the novel. It is true that the text contains many other language
varieties: scientific register and, above all, given the references to the imaginary
paratext represented by De Selby’s works, academic register. It is also arguable
that the language of law seems to share with all these special languages many
features, including hedging procedures, formal vocabulary and complex syntax.
However, the legal register pervades The Third Policeman as an all-encompassing
paradigm, as a weirdly normative framework that incorporates every other lexical
and stylistic trait and bends it to its vagrant, yet inexorable logic.
It should be underlined that by “language of law” I do not mean here a
special language functionally used in legal contexts, but rather an exasperated
use of legal jargon that aims at creating a sense of estrangement. The opacity of
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the language is not due to the presence of specific juridical terms and formulae,
but rather to bizarre wordplays and sentence constructions, to the accumulation
of propositions that set new hurdles rather than resolve existing ones.
2.1 Obscure language and “artificial syntax:” the legacy
of Old Irish law texts
The association of legal language with an esoteric jargon shared exclusively by
the community of lawyers and magistrates is, somehow, universal, but particu-
larly felt in the history of Irish literature. In his milestone analysis of Old Irish
syntax, professor MacCoisdealbha makes a survey of all the scholars who have
pointed out the connection between the obscurity of poetic language and that of
legal language.14 Heinrich Wagner, for instance, went so far as to assert that oral
poetry and the language of law in pre-literary Ireland belonged to the same
tradition. In his linguistic analysis of early Irish law tracts, Daniel Anthony
Binchy defined the druids (the filid) as a “a poetico-legal” school who, as
guardians of juridical lore, used “a deliberately obscure and artificial style,”
by which he meant
[…] a professional and semi-secret language, full of technical terms which made it largely
unintelligible to the uninitiated, the “rude and ignorant folk” whom the jurists, intent on
retaining their monopoly, sought to exclude from the practice of law. By grammarians and
others it was actually classed as a special branch of Irish under the name of bélre (later
Bérla) Féne “the language of the Féni.” (SOI, 231)
Treading on Binchy’s footsteps, Mac Cana defined this rhetoric as a distinct
genre, permeated by “a studied obscurity compounded of peculiarities or archa-
isms in style, syntax and vocabulary” (SOI, 231).
MacCoisdealbha substantiates the mutual influence between druidic and
legal esotericism, stressing that it affected not only the lexicon (he remarks
that a similar mystical drive inspired word formation in both practices) but
also the syntax. Evidence of an “artificial syntax” – a sort of deliberate “dis-
turbance” in the word order – can be observed in the presence of unusual
sentence constructions in both literary and legal (or semi-legal) texts. As Binchy
first argued, left-dislocation – cleft-sentences in particular – were typical
constructions in Irish law tracts, while Wagner confirmed that they were also
14 Pádraig MacCoisdealbha, The Syntax of the Sentence in Old Irish: Selected Studies from a
Descriptive, Historical and Comparative Point of View. New Edition with Additional Notes and an
Extended Bibliography (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), 231. Further references abbreviated as SOI.
442 Patrizia Nerozzi and Mara Logaldo
 - 10.1515/pol-2016-0023
Downloaded from De Gruyter Online at 09/28/2016 02:32:05PM by mara.logaldo@iulm.it
via Mara Logaldo
frequent in alliterative poetry. MacCoisdealbha concludes that “further research
in the difficult passages of the Laws and of poetry and the sagas will no doubt
bring fresh evidence to light through which the present theory may be revised
and improved upon” (SOI, 230). From this perspective, the significant incidence
of cleft-sentences in The Third Policeman may also reflect the tendency in the
Irish language to assimilate legal and literary discourse, even despite semantic
differences regarding sentence content. The latter discrepancy is actually rein-
forced to produce humor, thus confirming the ironic association. Here are some
examples taken from the Sergeant’s speeches:
It-cleft: “So my family shot him but if you ask me it was my great grandfather they shot and
it is the horse that is buried up in Cloncoonla Churchyard” (TP, 94).
There-cleft: “And then there is the question of bad brakes. The country is honeycombed with
bad brakes, half of the accidents are due to it, runs in families” (TP, 62).
Wh-cleft/Pseudo-cleft: “If a man stands before a mirror and sees in it his reflection, what he
sees is not a true reproduction of himself but a picture of himself when he was a younger
man” (TP, 66).
It is important to note that the connection of poetic and legal verbal practices is
mainly established on the ground of converging oral traditions. Even in written
law texts, it is this oral element that comes to the fore. With reference to Chríth
Gablach (a law text of the eighth century), for instance, Binchy commented that
“the compiler who gave the tract the form in which it has descended to the law
schools wove into it materials of a much earlier epoch: fragments of the oral
tradition (fénechas) in which the law had been handed down before it was
committed to writing” (SOI, 5). In this kind of practice, the cleaving also had
the function of giving to sentences a rhythmic pattern, endowing them with the
characteristic modulation of maxims and proverbs. Smith argues that the unu-
sual word order that is “scattered profusely through the Irish Laws,” not only
contributes to their obscurity but also makes statements sound like “cach for-
mulas […] maxims of a legal nature” (SOI, 132). A similar effect can also be
perceived in The Third Policeman, where cataphoric constructions do sometimes
suggest the style of magic formulae and prophecies, as in these sentences
uttered by the Sergeant:
“Martin Finnucane,” I said, “a hundred and two difficult thoughts I have to think between
this and my destination and the sooner the better” (TP, 51).
Many a grey hair it has put into my head, trying to regulate the people of this parish (TP,
92).
Down into the earth where dead men go I would go soon and maybe come out of it again
in some healthy way, free and innocent of all human perplexity (TP, 164).
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Yet, although comparing the language of the novel to the language of law can
prove a fruitful method of analysis – also from a historical perspective – the
characters’ speeches are far from representing specimen of forensic wisdom. On
the contrary, they appear as popularized versions of legal maxims: downgraded
to constabulary practice, the crypticism of legal language is deprived of its
solemn aura and made the object of parody. As a result, the mock-vatic tone
with which discourse is invested generates a constant wavering between high
and low register.
Left-dislocation has actually often been connected with the informal
features of oral communication, where it can serve several functions.15
The principal one is that of placing topical information upfront, a phenom-
enon that is also known as “topicalization.” As stated by J. S. Gruber with
specific reference to Irish English, the topicalization produced by cleft-
sentence is evident in child language (SOI, 10, 138). Maybe it is not by
chance that in The Third Policeman left-dislocation is particularly insistent
in the initial part, in which the protagonist reports facts of his early
childhood.
My father I do not remember (TP, 7).
My mother I can recall perfectly (TP, 7).
Always it was only the drone of his voice I heard (TP, 8).
Or when he relates uncanny phenomena that make him regress to a sort of
childish impotence in front of the mysterious, unnameable object that is being
topicalized:
What he states to have seen through his glass is astonishing (TP, 67).
What he was doing was no longer wonderful but terrible (TP, 76).
“He walked on looking worried and preoccupied as if what he was examining in his head
was unpleasant in a very intricate way” (TP, 85).
“Afterwards I saw that this was one of his rare jokes because what he showed me was
something that I could tell nobody about, there are no suitable words in the world to tell
my meaning” (TP, 139).
Unusual word order, left-dislocation in particular, are also used in the novel to
stress the actual author or cause of the crime.
15 Peter Cole, “Topicalization and Left-Dislocation: A Functional Analysis,” in Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences (New York: Academic Press, 1984), 213–25. Michelle L. Gregory
and Laura A. Michaelis, “Topicalization and Left-Dislocation: A Functional Opposition
Revisited,” Journal of Pragmatics 33 (2001): 1665–706.
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It was he who told me to bring the spade (TP, 7; my emphasis).
Perhaps it was this lie which was responsible for the bad things that happened to me
afterwards. I had no American gold watch” (TP, 38; my emphasis).
2.2 Parody of legal jargon
Along with the “artificial syntax” so far exemplified, it is on the lexical items of
legal English that Flann O’Brien founds his parodic treatment. Legal jargon, the
use of pro-forms, Latinisms, French words and phrases known as “doublets”
(usually the former of German origin and the latter of Latin origin) or even
“triplets” fall within this category.
Vocabulary, which, as already remarked, is mainly responsible for the
crypticism of law, is underlined, with effects that are both humorous and
uncanny. The overuse of juridical terms, even in situations in which colloquial
terms could have been adopted, is evident.
“Did you never study atomics when you were a lad?” asked the Sergeant, giving me a look
of great inquiry and surprise. “No,” I answered. “That is a very serious defalcation," he
said” (TP, 86; my emphasis).
Here the word “defalcation” (= from Latin for “deduction,” "withholding or
misappropriating funds held for another, particularly by a public official, or
failing to make a proper accounting”)16 could have been replaced by a more
neutral synonym such as “deficiency” or “failure.” Hence the word acquires
juridical connotations. Moreover, the admonishment can also be read as a pun
that refers to the protagonist’s attempts at misappropriating Mather’s black box,
a “defalcation” that actually taints his past.
Pro-forms indicate the tendency of legal language to make continuous cross-
references within the same discourse. Emphasis is placed not only on the
obscurity but also on the hollow, self-referential nature of constabulary style.
Is it in this perspective that we should read the Inspector’s pun about “the
meaning of the vacuity of the station in routine hours?” (TP, 99; my emphasis).
The use of pro-forms in the Sergeant’s speeches seems to endorse this view.
“It was your personal misfortune to be present adjacently at the time but it was likewise my
personal good fortune and good luck. There is no option but to stretch you for the serious
offence” (TP, 101; my emphasis).
16 Available at: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/defalcation (access June 8, 2015).
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Also Latin words are extensively used by the policemen, thus conferring to their
utterances a fairly mysterious but also hilarious twist, since they often sound too
emphatic and formal in relation to the context:
“In case we do not come up with the bicycle before it is high dinner-time,” said the
Sergeant, “I have left an official memorandum for the personal information of Policeman
Fox so that he will be acutely conversant with the res ipsa,” he said (TP, 79; my emphasis).
Latinisms are ridiculed by resorting to three devices: 1. through the choice of
Latin words of dubious or spurious origin; 2. by attributing vague meanings to
them; 3. by using them in a way that is not appropriate either to context or to
character.
The recurring word “conundrum” itself is a pseudo-Latin word of obscure
origin.17 Even if it is not a typical legal term, it is often used by the Sergeant with
the meaning of a difficult legal case that has to be solved. Some dictionaries overtly
define it as a fake, as a false Latinate coinage, even as an invented expression like
“hocus-pocus.” The Oxford English Dictionary says “origin lost”; or, probably
“originating in some university joke, or as a parody of some Latin term”; the
Chambers Dictionary reads: “etymology unknown; Oxford University term of the
1590s, slang for ‘pedant,’ also ‘whim,’ etc.; later (1790) ‘riddle,’ ‘puzzle.’ Also
spelled ‘quonundrum,’ ‘conibrum,’ ‘conuncrum,’ ‘quonumdrum,’ ‘connunder.’”18
The Online Etymology Dictionary defines it as “the sort of ponderous pseudo-Latin
word that was once the height of humor in learned circles.”19 Exhilarating forums
can still be found online about which should be the correct plural of conundrum:
“conundrums” or “conundra”? With the former winning over the latter precisely on
account of its not being a Latin word. To support this thesis, someone quotes
Jonson’s Volpone: “I must ha’ my crotchets! And my conundrums!”20
Conversely, actual Latin words are often made ambiguous, either by playing
with grammatical cases or with their polysemy.
“This is not today, this is yesterday,” he said, “but which of the difficulties is it? What is
the crux rei?” (TP, 63).
17 A Gaelic or German origin has been suggested: http://www.word-detective.com/2007/12/
conundrum/ (accessed June 3, 2015).
18 Anatoly Liberman, “Conundrum: A Cold Spoor Warmed Up,” Oxford Etymologist (December 8,
2008). Blog.oup.com/2008/12/conundrum Last accessed June 3, 2015.
19 “conundrum,” in Online Etymology Dictionary. Available at: http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/conundrum (accessed June 8, 2015).
20 Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,–5253,00.html
(accessed June 8, 2015).
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“Crux Rei” is an expression found in an eighteenth-century treatise on ancient
sacred terms by Blasio Ugolini.21 However, beside its literal meaning of “cross,”
“crux” is far more frequently used in English with the meaning of “torment,”
“puzzle” or “difficulty;” therefore, “crux rei” might refer to “the puzzling nature
of things” (Lat. “rei”; dat. pl. “rebus”). To complicate the pun, “rei” could also
have a legal meaning, if we think that it is also the genitive case of “reus”
(= “defendant”); so it could be read as “this is the crux of the defendant.”
More generally, owing to their exotic sound and esoteric aura, Latin words
can be made to mean almost anything. An example of this kind is the word
“omnium” (= “of all, belonging to all”). In the novel, “omnium” stands for the
changeless essence of all things as well as for universal knowledge, to the point
that perceiving its intangible frequencies would allow mankind to sort out the
conundrum of life and death. No one apart from the Sergeant can hear the
ineffable sound made by omnium or see its invisible hues. Omnium could even
stand for godly omniscience, thus suggesting the identification of law with
metaphysics. On the other hand, precisely on account of the fact that it can
mean everything as well as nothing, the word becomes so vague that it loses its
distinctive function in the code. In a sense, it ceases to be a word.
“Did you ever hear tell of omnium?”
“Omnium?”
“Omnium is the right name for it although you will not find it in the books.”
“Are you sure that is the right name?” I had never heard this word before except in Latin.
“Certain.”
“How certain?”
“The Sergeant says so.”
“And what is omnium the right name for?”
MacCruiskeen smiled at me indulgently.
“You are omnium and I am omnium and so is the mangle and my boots here and so is the
wind in the chimney.”
“That is enlightening,” I said. […] “It is the ultimate and the inexorable pancake. If you had
a sack of it or even the half-full of a small matchbox of it, you could do anything and even
do what could not be described by that name” (TP, 112–113).
Latinisms may also be inappropriate to context. In their conversations with the
unnamed protagonist of the story, the policemen repeatedly use Latin words,
thus conferring to their discourses an emphasis which, as already pointed
out, clashes with the seeming triviality of the situation (e.g. “non-possum and
noli-me-tangere,” TP, 86). This also gives rise to comical malapropisms or puns,
21 Blasio Ugolini, Thesaurus Antiquitatum Sacrarum, vol. 28 (Venice: apud Joannes Gabrielem
Herthz et Sebastianum Coletti, 1744–1769).
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as in this verbal exchange between the protagonist and the Sergeant, based on
the nonchalant shortening of the Latin word “cognomen” ( = “family name”) into
“cog,” whose meaning in English is actually different (“cog= “component,” “part,”
“gear,” “mechanism”) twinnedwith anotherwordplay (“surnoun” -> “name”/“noun”
-> “surname”):
“What is your cog?”
“My cog?”
“Your surnoun?”
“I have not got that either.” (TP, 58)
Other funny examples can be found in the way Latin words are used by the
wrong character, someone who is very unlikely to use such expressions. Martin
Finnucane, for instance, who is a street robber and an assassin and smokes like
a chimney (a sort of debased version of the caterpillar in Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland), is hardly credible or rather, becomes oddly farcical when he uses
words such as “desideratum,” “mutandum” and “ultimatum.”
“Martin Finnucane,” he repeated, listening to his own voice as if he were listening to the
sweetest music in the world. […] Tell me this,” he said at last. “Have you a desideratum?”
This queer question was unexpected but I answered it quickly enough.
I said I had.
“What desideratum?”
“To find what I am looking for.”
“That is a handsome desideratum,” said Martin Finnucane.
“What will you bring it about or mature its mutandum and bring it ultimately to passable
factivity?”
“Maybe indeed,” said Mr. Finnucane. “Have you an ultimatum?”
“I have a secret ultimatum,” I replied.
“I am sure it is a fine ultimatum,” he said, ‘but I will not ask you to recite it for me if you
think it is a secret one” (TP, 50).
Most of these words of Latin origin are malapropisms: “ultimatum,” for
instance, is meant to stand for “goal,” probably resorting to the homophony
with “ultimate;” on the other hand, it could also be interpreted literally, if we
consider that the protagonist is facing death.22
Also French words are extensively used, undergoing the same misplacement
or misuse.
22 Here is another example of malapropism: “You will agree,” he said, ‘that it is a fascinating
pancake and a conundrum of great incontinence, a phenomenon of the first rarity.” (TP, 127; my
emphasis).
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He put his little spear back on the shelf and looked at me crookedly from a sidewise angle
with a certain quantity of what may be called roi-s’amuse (TP, 69).
“It seems that our mutual friend Finnucane is in the environs” (TP, 99).
The Inspector required a captured prisoner as the least tiniest minimum for his inferior
bonhomie and mal d’esprit (TP, 101).
Doublets and triplets, which, as I said before, are typical features of legal
English, are emphasised and multiplied ad-libitum to achieve syntactic tours-
de-force and magnify an empty core of meaning.
“The bicycle will be found,” said the Sergeant, “when I retrieve and restore it to its own
owner in due law and possessively” (TP, 79).
“But I cannot get over what you confided in me privately sub-rosa about the no-bicycle,
that is a story that would make your golden fortune if you wrote down in a book where
people could pursue it literally” (TP, 72).
“The particular death you die is not even a death (which is an inferior phenomenon at the
best) only an insanitary abstraction in the backyard, a piece of negative nullity neutralized
and rendered void by asphyxiation and the fracture of the spinal string” (TP, 105).
“It is vexatious and unconscionable,” he added legally (TP, 140).
2.3 Tautology, contradiction and the limits
of language
On the whole, Flann O’Brien makes fun of the law by taking to the furthest
extent its tendency to use language redundantly. This is particularly evident in
the sentences uttered by the Sergeant:
“[…] or got the real informative information […]” (TP, 79).
“[…] we are watched and followed and dogged by a member of the gang” (TP, 81).
“[…] put your hands in under its underneath and start feeling promiscuously the way you
can ascertain factually if there is anything there in addition to its own nothing” (TP, 82).
“[…] if you lived here for a few days and gave full play to your observation and inspection,
you would know how certain the sureness of certainty is” (TP, 89).
“I have to ride long rides on my constabulary ridings” (TP, 101).
Some of these statements are utterly tautological: “The Sergeant spat spits on
the dry road. ‘We are going where we are going […]’” (TP, 80). Tautology is
popularly recognized as a distinctive constabulary practice inspired by the habit
of accumulating a plethora of, generally unnecessary, circumstantial details.
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This customary procedure is indirectly acknowledged by the narrator himself,
for instance when he replies to one of Mac-Cruiskeen’s absurd remarks
about bicycles and constabulary ridings in search of bicycle thieves that he
thinks the whole procedure is “extremely acataclectic” (TP, 77). “Acataclectic”
refers to verses whose final syllable is unstressed; now, since in English poetry
lines are mostly iambic, the term has come to mean something obvious and self-
explaining. “[…] robbery and murder are against the law” (TP, 48) is an example
of this kind of statements.
Beside tautology, we find contradictory statements, such as “It might be there
and it might not” (TP, 83); or “Your talk […] is surely the handiwork of wisdom
because not one word of it I do understand” (TP, 86). We also find counterfactual
conditionals, such as “If I had not lost my American gold watch it would be
possible for me to tell the time,” in this case followed by a statement that,
rhetorically, works as anticlimax: “You have no American gold watch” (TP, 54).
We may argue that, like many twentieth-century thinkers, Flann O’Brien
denies the principle of non-contradiction. Talking about tautology and contra-
diction, the philosopher that comes to mind is Wittgenstein, according to whom
the former has no truth-condition, for it is unconditionally true”23 while the
latter implies a saturation of logical space (TLP, 4.461). On the other hand,
tautology and contradiction are not merely senseless: they are “part of the
symbolism, in the same way as 0 is part of the symbolism of Arithmetic” (TLP,
4.611). Symbolism caught at its point of dissolution.” Tautologies, according to
Wittgenstein, “describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather, they present it.”
(TLP, 6.124). In The Third Policeman, contradictions and tautologies suggest this
point of dissolution, the gibbet constructed by language, frightening and sub-
lime, suspended in a perfect sky, like the one that awaits the protagonist of the
story: “Through the window I could see the scaffold of raw timber rearing itself
high into the heavens […]” (TP, 157).
After all, as the practical Mr Gilhaney asserts, “there is a charm about a
scaffold if it is well-made and satisfactory” (TP, 116). While the philosopher
denies the possibility of describing the experience of death through language
and stops at the threshold of incommunicability – rejecting a mystique which
goes beyond human experience by taking language along with it – the writer
continues his metaphorical journey through death by writing his novel, by
telling us his fable of law. “You don’t mean to say that you believe in this
eternity business?” says the Sergeant. To which the protagonist (and, I would
add, also the reader) replies: “What choice have I?” (TP, 129).
23 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
Company, Inc., 1922), 4.461. Further references abbreviated as TLP.
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In an afterlife that mirrors human sense of guilt, argumentations can be
found about anything (from houses to bicycles and robbers), even by resorting
to argumenta ad absurdum. As Joe, the personification of the protagonist’s
conscience remarks, “Apparently there is no limit […]. Anything can be said in
this place and it will be true and will have to be believed” (TP, 88). Still, the
“inexorable logic” at the core of The Third Policeman is that any attempt at
describing death non-metaphorically is bound to remain frustrated, “a lump”
that swells “tragically in my throat” (TP, 106). The idea of death as a dimension
in which reality simply ceases to exist can only be represented through figures of
speech and other rhetorical devices that stress the limits of language. Paralexis,
in which the narrator avows his inability to describe what he sees; chiasmus,
with clauses that annul each other in an endless play of reflections; a paroxysm
of questions and negations, which are certainly comical but also suggest a
labyrinthine view of language. In the end, are not these the only rights of a
defendant? The right not to answer questions and the right to deny every
allegation until evidence is found? In this, language faithfully mirrors the
human condition in the face of God’s law.
Although The Third Policeman actualizes the immense creative potential of
language, it is ultimately a novel about its limits. It shows to what extent the
writer can “stretch” words, and in so doing, both extend their spectrum and
“snap” them. Along with the plot, language itself turns into a loop. The story
ends exactly as it started; language can either endlessly repeat itself or cease to
mean, dying into “a hollow laugh” (TP, 164). This is the closest image of eternity
the writer may attain. As for the anguish of death, it goes beyond any possible
fable of law, even beyond language. “The box is full of noise,” we read in the
final part. The “incommunicable poignancy” (TP, 106) of death can only be
expressed by a scream. At this point, even the existence of the syntagmatic and
paradigmatic axes of language as a necessary condition to produce meaning is
denied.
Three or four words compressed into one ragged shout. I could not be sure what it was but
several phrases sprang into my head together and each of them could have been the
contents of the shout. […] What happened eventually was not a shout but a shrill scream, a
sound not unlike the call of rats yet far shriller than any sound which could be made by
man or animal. Again I thought that words had been used but the exact meaning of them
or the language they belonged to was quite uncertain (TP, 111–112).
In this inarticulate sound or incomprehensible foreign tongue lies the (unattain-
able) solution of the riddle: “If you could say what the shouts mean it might be
the makings of the answer” (TP, 114).
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